Ju, Y., Borm, P. and Ruys, P. (2007) The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games. Social Choice and Welfare, 28 (4). pp. 685-703. ISSN 0176-1714
Abstract
To generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU games into n-person cases, this paper introduces a recursive two-sided negotiation process to establish cooperation between all players. This leads to a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. An explicit comparison with the Shapley value is provided, also at the axiomatic level. Moreover, a class of possible generalizations of the consensus value is introduced and axiomatized with the Shapley value at one end and the equal surplus solution at the other. Finally, we discuss a non-cooperative mechanism which implements the consensus value.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | York RAE Import |
Date Deposited: | 12 Feb 2009 15:43 |
Last Modified: | 12 Feb 2009 15:43 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer Science + Business Media |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:7468 |