Nordhoff, P. (2003) Believe what you want. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101 (3). pp. 247-266. ISSN 0066-7374
Abstract
The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don't work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability Thesis is true, or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further argue that the explanations don't cut deep enough. Making the aim of truth internal to a state does not explain why we can't produce at will states without this feature but sharing these states' motivational role. I put forward a different explanation. I argue that consciousness makes manifest the attraction of the norm of truth. If we are consciously attending to the question of whether p, we cannot help but make a judgement in line with what the evidence gives us grounds for believing true.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | York RAE Import |
Date Deposited: | 20 Feb 2009 12:39 |
Last Modified: | 20 Feb 2009 12:39 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9264.00095 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publishers |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/1467-9264.00095 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:7323 |