NOORDHOF, P. (2007) Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67 (1). pp. 75-100. ISSN 0031-8205
Abstract
I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of total evidence—are given a weight in attentive consciousness which does not correspond to our reflective judgement of their weight. Successful interpretation does not involve ascribing beliefs and desires by reference to what a subject ought to believe and desire, contrary to what Interpretists suggest.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | York RAE Import |
Date Deposited: | 27 Feb 2009 11:35 |
Last Modified: | 27 Feb 2009 11:35 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00026... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00026.x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:7198 |