Allen, K. (2007) The Mind-Independence of Colour. European Journal of Philosophy, 15 (2). pp. 137-158. ISSN 0966-8373
Abstract
The view that the mind-dependence of colour is implicit in our ordinary thinking has a distinguished history. With its origins in Berkeley, the view has proved especially popular amongst so-called ‘Oxford’ philosophers, proponents including Cook Wilson (1904: 773-4), Pritchard (1909: 86-7), Ryle (1949: 209), Kneale (1950: 123) and McDowell (1985: 112). Gareth Evans’s discussion of secondary qualities in “Things Without the Mind” is representative of this tradition. It is his version of the view that I consider in this paper.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | York RAE Import |
Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2009 15:41 |
Last Modified: | 28 Aug 2009 15:41 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publishing |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:6157 |
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