Stoneham, Tom orcid.org/0000-0001-5490-4927 (2007) A reductio of coherentism. Analysis. pp. 254-257. ISSN 0003-2638
Abstract
An argument is presented which shows that coherence theories of justification are committed to a conception of epistemic support which conflicts with an axiom of probability theory.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2007 Tom Stoneham. This is an electronic version of an article published in Analysis, complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of Analysis, is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal's Blackwell website or at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com. |
Keywords: | Coherence theory of justification |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Tom Stoneham |
Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2007 |
Last Modified: | 09 Dec 2024 00:06 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00683.x |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00683.x |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:2524 |
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