Abdolmaleki, B., Campanelli, M., Dao, Q. et al. (1 more author) (2026) On the simulation-extractability of proof-carrying data. In: Bai, S. and Persichetti, E., (eds.) UNSPECIFIED 29th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, 25-28 May 2026, West Palm Beach, Florida, USA. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 16553. Springer Nature Switzerland, pp. 269-302. ISBN: 9783032267368.
Abstract
Proof-carrying data (PCD) is a powerful paradigm for verifying distributed computations. Each node in the computation produces a proof that can be checked efficiently, regardless of how complex the overall computation is. As PCDs—and their special case, incrementally verifiable computation (IVC)—gain wider adoption, it becomes crucial to understand how robust they are against malleability attacks. In particular, it remains completely unexplored whether recursive proof systems satisfy simulation extractability (SIM-EXT)—a property ensuring non-malleability and composability. This work provides the first systematic study of simulation extractability for PCD. We begin by observing that the standard SIM-EXT notion for non-recursive zkSNARKs does not directly extend to PCD/IVC settings. To address this, we propose a new definition of SIM-EXT tailored to proof-carrying data that accounts for their idiosyncratic features. Using this framework, we prove two general results: (1) that a simulation-extractable SNARK implies a simulation-extractable PCD when used recursively, and (2) that more lightweight PCD constructions—built from a (not necessarily succinct) argument of knowledge (NARK) combined with a split-accumulation scheme—also achieve SIM-EXT of PCD by requiring SIM-EXT only from the underlying NARK. Our results show that many modern PCD systems are already simulation-extractable by design.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Proceedings Paper |
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| Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2026 The Authors. Except as otherwise noted, this author-accepted version of a paper published in Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2026 is made available via the University of Sheffield Research Publications and Copyright Policy under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| Keywords: | Distributed Computing and Systems Software; Information and Computing Sciences |
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| Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
| Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Engineering (Sheffield) > Department of Computer Science (Sheffield) |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2026 08:15 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Jul 2026 13:31 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | Springer Nature Switzerland |
| Series Name: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Identification Number: | 10.1007/978-3-032-26737-5_9 |
| Related URLs: | |
| Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:243145 |
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