Gerzso, Thalia orcid.org/0000-0001-9390-5121 (2026) Judicial capture in the authoritarian eco-system: Strategies, conditions, and pathway to resistance. Research Report. The authoritarian ecosystem .
Abstract
Courts have become central actors in political and constitutional decision-making, making them key targets for autocrats seeking to consolidate power. Judicial capture rarely occurs through overt repression; instead, autocrats rely on incremental institutional strategies such as controlling judicial appointments and tenure, exerting financial pressure, fragmenting court systems, and restricting access to justice. These strategies are effective because they raise the costs of judicial independence while preserving an appearance of legality that limits domestic and international backlash. Judicial capture is not inevitable. Courts often show a greater capacity to resist authoritarian pressure than other institutions, especially when they are institutionally insulated from executive influence and supported by a mobilised civil society and legal community. Preventing judicial capture and strengthening judicial resistance requires a comprehensive approach that combines holistic judicial design, capacity-building, strategic litigation, and engagement with international and regional judicial frameworks.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Monograph |
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| Authors/Creators: |
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| Dates: |
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| Institution: | The University of York |
| Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Politics (York) |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Jun 2026 16:00 |
| Last Modified: | 31 Jul 2026 23:24 |
| Status: | Published |
| Series Name: | The authoritarian ecosystem |
| Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:241772 |
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