TRUEMAN, ROB orcid.org/0000-0002-2908-7985 (Accepted: 2026) Fregean predication. Mind. ISSN: 0026-4423 (In Press)
Abstract
My aim in this paper is to offer a novel justification for β-Equivalence. β-Equivalence is a standard principle of higher-order logic, but it is metaphysically controversial. My argument for β-Equivalence is based on a distinctively Fregean conception of predication. I argue that the Fregean conception motivates a non-standard notation for predicates, which can then be used to show that β-Equivalence is trivial on the Fregean conception. I also argue that the Fregean conception motivates a functional individuation of properties, which we can use to extend the Fregean justification for β-Equivalence to cover a more general principle, β-Conversion.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Authors/Creators: |
|
| Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the University’s Research Publications and Open Access policy. |
| Dates: |
|
| Institution: | The University of York |
| Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Apr 2026 14:00 |
| Last Modified: | 06 May 2026 04:36 |
| Status: | In Press |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:240646 |
Download
Filename: Fregean_predication_300426.pdf
Description: Fregean predication 300426
Licence: CC-BY 2.5

CORE (COnnecting REpositories)
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)