To Signal or Not to Signal? A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach to Discretionary Communication Between Road Users

Bitar, I. orcid.org/0000-0002-5130-0148, Solernou Crusat, A. orcid.org/0000-0003-4857-0240, Romano, R. orcid.org/0000-0002-2132-4077 et al. (1 more author) (2025) To Signal or Not to Signal? A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach to Discretionary Communication Between Road Users. SN Computer Science, 7. 3. ISSN: 2661-8907

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Item Type: Article
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© The Author(s) 2025. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Keywords: Game theory, Communication, Cheap talk, Non-cooperative games, Bayesian games, Emergent cooperation, Discretionary communication, First mover advantage
Dates:
  • Accepted: 11 November 2025
  • Published (online): 17 December 2025
  • Published: 17 December 2025
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Environment (Leeds) > Institute for Transport Studies (Leeds) > ITS: Safety and Technology (Leeds)
The University of Leeds > Faculty of Environment (Leeds) > Institute for Transport Studies (Leeds)
Date Deposited: 18 Feb 2026 14:00
Last Modified: 18 Feb 2026 14:00
Status: Published
Publisher: Springer
Identification Number: 10.1007/s42979-025-04533-w
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