Why committing epistemic injustice against close friends can be distinctively bad

There has been increasing attention given to epistemic injustice in different relational contexts. This paper adds to this literature by providing a novel argument for the claim that epistemic injustice in close friendship is distinctively bad. That is, while it is bad to be epistemically unjust to anyone, it can be distinctively bad to be epistemically unjust to one’s close friends. The friendship, at least in some cases, must figure in the explanation for why the injustice is bad. I argue that there are three reasons friendship gives us that we can appeal to in explaining this. Being friends with someone (especially, close friends) gives us reasons to support them emotionally, create conditions in which they can comfortably self-disclose, and to promote their self-esteem, including their epistemic self-confidence, especially when this is unduly undermined. Perpetrating epistemic injustice against our friends compromises our ability to respond to those reasons appropriately. The paper begins by setting out the initial intuition - that we do feel that epistemic injustice is distinctively bad in friendship, at least in some cases. It responds to some initial objections. It examines the empirical evidence on testimonially unjust microaggressions in friendship, which suggests they are an unfortunately common occurrence with significant effects on those who experience them, thus, worthy of philosophical attention. It gives an account of the three salient reasons friendship gives us, that epistemic injustice compromises. And it examines two cases of epistemic injustice being perpetrated against friends in detail, illustrating how this injustice undermines the ability of the perpetrator to live up to these reasons.