Closing the Cartesian bureau de change

In A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness, Walter Veit sets out a Darwinian framework for understanding consciousness. He distinguishes various dimensions of consciousness, explores their distribution in different species, and traces their roots to an ancient system of hedonic valence, which evolved to solve complex problems of action selection in early animals. This approach places Veit firmly within a new ‘post-Cartesian’ paradigm for consciousness science, which treats consciousness as a complex functional state, which can be studied by standard scientific means – in contrast to the traditional Cartesian paradigm, which focused on irreducibly subjective qualia and the ‘hard problem’ they present. However, there are places where Veit’s discussion displays residual Cartesian influence. Veit continues to use Cartesian terms such as ‘qualia’, and he suggests that states of hedonic valence play their functional role in virtue of their ‘feel’, implying a subjective realm – a ‘Cartesian bureau de change’ – where intrinsic value is felt and reacted to. This weakens Veit’s presentation, and I urge him to commit to a thoroughly functionalist account. The Cartesian and post-Cartesian paradigms are incommensurable, and in order to achieve a Darwinian revolution in consciousness studies, the concept of an irreducibly subjective mental realm must be completely abandoned.