Delusion and Non-Doxasticism

Non-doxasticists about delusion are united by the idea that at least some kinds of delusion involve subjects in which the state whose content characterises the delusion (hereafter the delusion-characterising state) is not a belief. Non-doxasticism can come in different strengths depending upon whether a delusion-characterising non-doxastic state is an essential feature of delusion (Strong Non-Doxasticism) or a feature of some cases of delusion (Weak Non-Doxasticism). A key question for non-doxasticists is the kind of non-doxastic state that is delusion-characterising because there are variety of such states and some differences of view as to their proper characterisation. In the first section of the chapter, I shall make some preliminary clarifications about the nature of these states and their relationship to empirical work on belief. In the second section, I will discuss grounds that have led non-doxasticists to espouse their approach, revisiting the arguments against doxasticism discussed in the chapter on Delusion and Doxasticism. In section 3, I will consider the particular versions of non-doxasticism that have been offered and the challenges they face, dividing the territory into those which add an appeal to meta-cognitive states, those that postulate a hybrid state and those that are developed within a two-level account of cognition.