No longer what you used to be:Renegotiating Relations between De Facto States and Their Patrons

The dependence of de facto states/breakaway-territories on external patrons is well-established, but we lack detailed knowledge of the dynamics of these hierarchical relationships, including opportunities for client agency. Through a comparative study of two patron-client relationships that had reached a crisis point, this article examines how the weaker client responds when at odds with its patron. Drawing on original data, including archival sources and interviews, it provides a bottom-up analysis of the relationship between Serbia and Republika Srpska after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh immediately after the 2020 war. The out-of-equilibrium behaviour presents an opportunity for analysing the underlying mechanisms of patron-client relationships. In both cases, the crisis resulted in deep mistrust of the patron, but the de facto states were unable to sever links. They were constrained by a lack of reliable alternative supporters, continued patron dependence, and powerful ethno-nationalist narratives. Non-recognition added to the client’s weakness, yet we still find clear examples of agency: external supporters were courted, and patrons were pressured through obstruction or appeals to its domestic forces. What resulted was a renegotiated, less hierarchical relationship. The article adds to our understanding of patron-client relationships, including those involving non-sovereign entities where an effective patronage monopoly still exists. It contributes to the existing literature with typologies of patron-client crises and client strategies for reclaiming autonomy, and with detailed empirical evidence of client agency and constraining factors, and by demonstrating the potential leverage of some of the weakest international actors.