Deceptive choice architecture and behavioral audits: A principles‐based approach

Abstract

Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well‐meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles‐based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.

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Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Mills, S. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6698-0983
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© 2024 The Authors. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Keywords:	4803 International and Comparative Law; 4807 Public Law; 44 Human Society; 48 Law and Legal Studies; 4407 Policy and Administration; Behavioral and Social Science
Dates:	Published: 27 March 2024 Published (online): 27 March 2024 Accepted: 12 March 2024
Institution:	The University of Leeds
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > Economics Division (LUBS) (Leeds)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited:	07 Aug 2024 15:29
Last Modified:	07 Aug 2024 15:29
Published Version:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rego.12590
Status:	Published online
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell
Identification Number:	10.1111/rego.12590
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:215844

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Deceptive choice architecture and behavioral audits: A principles‐based approach

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