Li, F., Li, K. orcid.org/0000-0001-6657-0522, Peng, C. et al. (1 more author) (2025) Security control of direct current microgrids under deception attacks—A dynamic event-triggered approach. Asian Journal of Control, 27 (1). pp. 410-426. ISSN 1561-8625
Abstract
This paper studies the security control of direct current (DC) microgrids under deception attacks, and a dynamic event-triggered mechanism (DETM) is proposed to save constrained network bandwidth. The DETM can reduce the frequency of data communications and exclude Zeno behavior inherently. Then, a time-delay closed-loop system model is built, which integrates parameters of the DC microgrid, the DETM, deception attacks, injection current controller, and network-induced delays in one unified framework. Sufficient conditions are derived for globally exponentially ultimately bounded stability in mean square, which establish the relationship between system performance and the contributing factors such as the DETM, deception attacks, and network delays. Further, a co-design method is presented to derive the parameters of the controller and the DETM in just one step. Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed method for security control of DC microgrids, achieving 21.5% savings of communication resources while effectively stabilizing the system even 10.7% of the transmitted data that are manipulated by the deception attacks.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2024 Chinese Automatic Control Society and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: F. Li, K. Li, C. Peng, and L. Gao, Security control of direct current microgrids under deception attacks—A dynamic event-triggered approach, Asian J. Control (2024), 1–17, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/asjc.3441. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited. |
Keywords: | DC microgrids, deception attacks, event-triggered mechanism, exponentially ultimate boundedness |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Engineering & Physical Sciences (Leeds) > School of Electronic & Electrical Engineering (Leeds) > Institute of Communication & Power Networks (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 03 Jul 2024 09:30 |
Last Modified: | 12 Mar 2025 11:01 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Identification Number: | 10.1002/asjc.3441 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:214313 |
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