Ratcliffe, Matthew James orcid.org/0000-0003-4519-4833 (2024) On Losing Certainty. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. ISSN 1568-7759
Abstract
This paper develops a phenomenological account of what it is to lose a primitive and pervasive sense of certainty. I begin by considering Wolfgang Blankenburg’s descriptions of losing common sense or natural self-evidence. Although Blankenburg focuses primarily on schizophrenia, I note that a wider range of phenomenological disturbances can be understood in similar terms—one loses something that previously operated as a pre-reflective, unquestioned basis for experience, thought, and practice. I refer to this as the loss of certainty. Drawing upon and integrating themes in the work of Wittgenstein and Husserl, I propose that losses of certainty centrally involve the inability to tolerate a certain kind of uncertainty. The contrast between having and lacking certainty is to be construed in terms of differing patterns or styles of nonlocalized, practical, bodily anticipation. I conclude by showing how this conception enables us to better understand various different disturbances to which human experience is susceptible.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2024 |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 29 May 2024 10:40 |
Last Modified: | 27 Mar 2025 00:10 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09999-2 |
Status: | Published online |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11097-024-09999-2 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:212803 |