Stuart, Mike orcid.org/0000-0002-4165-2641 (2023) Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination. Philosophy of Science. pp. 518-538. ISSN 0031-8248
Abstract
Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that offer different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s), 2022. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 02 Feb 2024 10:40 |
Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2025 00:52 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.31 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/psa.2022.31 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:208627 |
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