Forteza, A., Mussio, I. orcid.org/0000-0003-3724-9865 and Pereyra, J.S. (2024) Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 108. 102128. ISSN 2214-8043
Abstract
If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of an article published in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0) in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Political agency; separation of powers; checks and balances; lab experiment |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > Economics Division (LUBS) (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 27 Nov 2023 10:49 |
Last Modified: | 25 Feb 2025 14:06 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102128 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:205899 |
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Filename: Experiment_Special_Powers.pdf
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