Modak Chowdhury, S. orcid.org/0000-0002-8386-9144 and Kim, S.-H. (2023) The central influencer theorem: spatial voting contests with endogenous coalition formation. Working Paper. Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series, 2023019 (2023019). Department of Economics, University of Sheffield ISBN 1749-8368
Abstract
We introduce a spatial voting contest without the ‘one person, one vote’ restriction. Players exert costly effort to influence the policy and the outcome is obtained through an adjustment function. Players are heterogeneous in terms of the position in the policy line, disutility function, and the effort cost. In equilibrium, two groups endogenously emerge: players in one group try to implement more leftist policy, while those in the other group try more rightist one. Since the larger group suffers a more severe free-riding problem, the equilibrium policy converges to the center only when the larger group has a cost advantage. We demonstrate how the location of the center (i.e., the steady-state point) can be either median, or a mean of all points, or a mean of the extreme points, depending on the convexities of the utility and cost functions. This reflects some well-known results as special cases. We extend the model to an infinite horizon setting and show that the median outcome can be reached only under certain conditions.
Metadata
Item Type: | Monograph |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2023 The Author(s). For reuse permissions, please contact the Author(s). The Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series (SERPS) offers a forum for the research output of the Department of Economics, University of Sheffield. Papers are reviewed for quality and presentation by two internal referees and a departmental editor. However, the contents and opinions expressed remain the responsibility of the author(s). Comments are welcomed and should be addressed to the individual author(s). |
Keywords: | Spatial Competition; Contest; Lobbying; Median Voter Theorem |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) > Sheffield Economics Research Papers Series The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 21 Aug 2023 15:08 |
Last Modified: | 22 Aug 2023 00:50 |
Published Version: | https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/economics/research/ser... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Department of Economics, University of Sheffield |
Series Name: | Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:202582 |