Reproductive justice:Non-interference or non-domination?

The reproductive justice movement started by black women's rights activists made its way into the academic literature as an intersectional approach to women's reproductive autonomy. While there are many scholars who now employ the term 'reproductive justice' in their research, few have taken up the task of explaining what 'justice' entails in reproductive justice. In this paper I take up part of this work and attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of reproductive justice would postulate. To do so, I compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach based on freedom as non-interference and an approach based on freedom as non-domination. I then argue that the non-domination approach better fits the ideals of the reproductive justice movement as set forth by its founders and should be treated as one of the necessary conditions in any non-ideal account of reproductive justice. Towards the end, I single out epistemic non-domination as crucial in shaping the narrative around reproductive justice.