Roussillon, Beatrice and Schweinzer, Paul orcid.org/0000-0002-6437-7224 (2010) Efficient emissions reduction. [Preprint]
Abstract
We propose a simple mechanism capable of achieving international agreement on the reduction of harmful emissions to their efficient level. It employs a contest creating incentives among participating nations to simultaneously exert efficient productive and efficient abatement efforts. Participation in the most stylised formulation of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational. All rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed. The scheme balances its budget and requires no principal. The mechanism provides a benchmark result for the cost of the implementation of these desirable properties. In a more realistic setup which could potentially inform policy decisions, we discuss participation enforcement through punishment clauses, exclusive trade agreements and environmental standards and show that they are effectively discouraging free-riding.
Metadata
Item Type: | Preprint |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Keywords: | Climate policy,Contests,Efficiency |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 08 Jun 2023 23:13 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 11:33 |
Status: | Published |
Series Name: | University of Manchester Discussion Paper Series |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:200151 |