Political economy of redistribution between traditional and modern families

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Abstract

We analyse a model in which families may either be ‘traditional’ single-earner that care for the child at home or be ‘ modern’ double-earner households that use market child care. Family policies may favour one or the other group, like market care subsidies vs. cash-for-care. Policies are determined by probabilistic voting, where distributional impacts matter, both within and across groups. A higher share of modern households—which can be induced by changes in social norms or by changes in gender wage inequality—may have non-monotone effects, with lower net subsidies to traditional households when their share is very low or very high, and higher subsidies in some intermediate stage. This may explain the implementation of cash-for-care policies and their subsequent tightening in late stages of development, when most voters come from modern households, observed in Norway and Sweden.

Metadata

Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Meier, V. Rablen, M.D. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3521-096X
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© The Author(s) 2023. Open Access: This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Keywords:	redistribution; child care; cash-for-care; subsidies; family policy; probabilistic voting
Dates:	Published: August 2024 Published (online): 28 June 2023 Accepted: 4 June 2023
Institution:	The University of Sheffield
Academic Units:	The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited:	15 Jun 2023 15:42
Last Modified:	27 Aug 2024 08:10
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Springer
Refereed:	Yes
Identification Number:	10.1007/s10797-023-09786-w
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:200123

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