Papadia, Andrea and Schioppa, Claudio A. (2024) Foreign Debt, Capital Controls, and Secondary Markets:Theory and Evidence from Nazi Germany. Journal of Political Economy. ISSN 1537-534X
Abstract
We investigate how internal distribution motives can affect the implementation of an important macroeconomic policy: capital controls. To do this, we study one of history’s largest debt repatriations, which took place under strict capital controls in 1930s Germany, providing a wealth of quantitative and historical evidence. We show that the authorities kept private repatriations under strict control, thus avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects, while allowing discretionary repatriations in order to reap internal political benefits. We formalize this mechanism in a model in which elite capture can affect optimal debt repatriations and the management of official reserves under capital controls.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2024 The University of Chicago. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jun 2023 07:40 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 19:15 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1086/728112 |
Status: | Published online |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1086/728112 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:200113 |
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