Chowdhury, S.M. and Topolyan, I. (2016) Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction. Social Choice and Welfare, 47 (4). pp. 959-971. ISSN 0176-1714
Abstract
We analyze a group political lobbying all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize, in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. We completely characterize all semi-symmetric equilibria. There are two types of equilibria: (1) each player in the best-shot group puts mass at the upper bound of the support, whereas each player in the other group puts mass at the lower bound of the support; (2) players in the best-shot group put masses at both the lower and the upper bounds, while the other group randomizes without a mass point.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Social Choice and Welfare. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Lobby Group; Impact Function; Pure Strategy Equilibrium; Winning Probability; Mixed Strategy; Equilibrium |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 01 Jun 2023 14:56 |
Last Modified: | 02 Jun 2023 02:04 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer Science and Business Media LLC |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s00355-016-1000-1 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:199703 |