Post-cartel tacit collusion: determinants, consequences, and prevention

Chowdhury, S.M. and Crede, C.J. orcid.org/0000-0002-1547-0086 (2020) Post-cartel tacit collusion: determinants, consequences, and prevention. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70. 102590. ISSN 0167-7187

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Item Type: Article
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© 2020 Elsevier B.V. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in International Journal of Industrial Organization. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Keywords: Tacit collusion; Antitrust; Cartels; Price hysteresis; Experiment
Dates:
  • Published: May 2020
  • Published (online): 17 March 2020
  • Accepted: 9 February 2020
Institution: The University of Sheffield
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield)
Depositing User: Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited: 31 May 2023 06:54
Last Modified: 31 May 2023 13:03
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102590
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Filename: PCTC_IJIO.pdf

Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0

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