Hougaard, J.L. and Tvede, M. orcid.org/0000-0003-0566-7026 (2012) Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models. European Journal of Operational Research, 222 (3). pp. 566-570. ISSN 0377-2217
Abstract
In this paper we consider the minimum cost spanning tree model. We assume that a central planner aims at implementing a minimum cost spanning tree not knowing the true link costs. The central planner sets up a game where agents announce link costs, a tree is chosen and costs are allocated according to the rules of the game. We characterize ways of allocating costs such that true announcements constitute Nash equilibria both in case of full and incomplete information. In particular, we find that the Shapley rule based on the irreducible cost matrix is consistent with truthful announcements while a series of other well-known rules (such as the Bird-rule, Serial Equal Split, and the Proportional rule) are not.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2012 Elsevier B.V. |
Keywords: | Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Incomplete information; Minimum cost spanning tree; Shapley value; Nash equilibrium; Truth-telling |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jan 2023 17:33 |
Last Modified: | 05 Jan 2023 17:33 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier BV |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.05.023 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:194906 |