Crès, H. and Tvede, M. orcid.org/0000-0003-0566-7026 (2013) Production externalities: internalization by voting. Economic Theory, 53 (2). pp. 403-424. ISSN 0938-2259
Abstract
We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2012 Springer-Verlag. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Economic Theory. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | General equilibrium; Majority voting; Production externalities; Shareholder governance versus stakeholder democracy; Social choice |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jan 2023 17:29 |
Last Modified: | 05 Jan 2023 17:29 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer Science and Business Media LLC |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s00199-012-0697-z |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:194905 |