Hougaard, J.L., Moreno-Ternero, J.D., Tvede, M. et al. (1 more author) (2017) Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. Games and Economic Behavior, 102. pp. 98-110. ISSN 0899-8256
Abstract
We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016 Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
Keywords: | Hierarchies; Joint ventures; Resource allocation; Geometric rules; MIT strategy |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2023 15:57 |
Last Modified: | 07 Jan 2023 01:12 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier BV |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:194803 |
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