Crès, H. and Tvede, M. (2022) Aggregation of opinions in networks of individuals and collectives. Journal of Economic Theory, 199. 105305. ISSN 0022-0531
Abstract
We study the formation of opinions in a bipartite network of firms' boards and directors theoretically. A director and a board are connected provided the director is a board member. Opinions are sets of beliefs about the likelihood of different states of the world tomorrow. Our basic assumption is that boards as well as directors aggregate opinions of each other: a production plan is better than another for a board (director) provided every director (board of which she is a member) finds it better. Opinions are stable provided aggregation does not result in revision of opinions. We show that for connected networks: opinions are stable if and only if they are unambiguous and identical; and repeated aggregation leads to stable opinions. Hence, there will eventually be a single society-wide intersubjective “truth”.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Journal of Economic Theory. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
Keywords: | Boards; Directors; Networks; Pareto principle |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2023 14:41 |
Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2023 14:41 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105305 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier BV |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105305 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:194797 |