Shimoji, Makoto orcid.org/0000-0002-7895-9620 (2022) Setting an exam as an information design problem. International Journal of Economic Theory. ISSN 1742-7363
Abstract
We take a teacher's exam-setting task as an information design problem. Specifically, the teacher chooses a conditional distribution of grades given students' types. After observing their exam results, each student updates her belief regarding her type via Bayes' rule and chooses an action. Students' reactions to the same exam result could be different, depending on their heterogeneous prior beliefs. The teacher's objective is to persuade students to take a certain action (e.g., applying to universities), which some may not choose without an exam. The teacher adopts different grade distributions, depending on the teacher's and the students' heterogeneous prior beliefs.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2022 The Authors |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 04 Jan 2023 09:40 |
Last Modified: | 23 Jan 2025 00:32 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12368 |
Status: | Published online |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/ijet.12368 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:194793 |
Download
Filename: Int_J_of_Economic_Theory_2022_Shimoji_Setting_an_exam_as_an_information_design_problem.pdf
Description: Int J of Economic Theory - 2022 - Shimoji - Setting an exam as an information design problem
Licence: CC-BY 2.5