Reuter, K., Messerli, M. and Barlassina, L. orcid.org/0000-0002-7282-9729 (2022) Not more than a feeling in advance. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1). pp. 41-50. ISSN 2161-2234
Abstract
Affect-based theorists and life satisfaction theorists disagree about the nature of happiness, but agree about this methodological principle: a philosophical theory of happiness should be in line with the folk concept HAPPINESS. In this article, we present two empirical studies indicating that it is affect-based theories that get the folk concept HAPPINESS right: competent speakers judge a person to be happy if and only if that person is described as feeling pleasure/good most of the time. Our studies also show that the judgement that a person is feeling pleasure/good most of the time reliably brings about the judgement that they are satisfied with their life, even if that person is described as not satisfied. We suggest that this direct causal relation between the concepts POSITIVE AFFECT and LIFE SATISFACTION might explain why many philosophers have been attracted to life satisfaction theories.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Thought Trust. This Open Access article is distributed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Keywords: | happiness; affect-based theories; life satisfaction theories; typicality hypothesis; direct causation hypothesis; hedonism; empirical studies |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2022 11:02 |
Last Modified: | 25 Sep 2024 14:01 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Philosophy Documentation Center |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.5840/tht20229206 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:192147 |