Baik, K.H., Chowdhury, S.M. and Ramalingam, A. (2021) Group size and matching protocol in contests. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 54 (4). pp. 1716-1736. ISSN 0008-4085
Abstract
We investigate the effects of group size and matching protocol in Tullock contest experiments. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, we implement partner and random stranger-matching protocols in contests between two and between three players. Group size does not affect overall absolute bid levels, but the rate of overbidding is lower in two-player groups across matching protocols. Matching protocol does not affect bidding behaviour for three-player groups, but a partner matching reduces both the level and dispersion of bids in two-player groups. These results show the joint effect of group size and matching protocol and suggest that identifiability in repeated play facilitates tacit collusion.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Authors/Creators: |
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| Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2022 Canadian Economics Association. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Canadian Journal of Economics. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
| Dates: |
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| Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
| Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Oct 2022 15:39 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Jan 2024 01:13 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Identification Number: | 10.1111/caje.12557 |
| Related URLs: | |
| Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:192123 |
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