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Funding Information: Initially both dams appeared to have wider government backing. This is particularly true for the Stiegler’s Gorge project, long-considered a flagship by the ruling CCM and associated with Tanzania’s founder Nyerere. The Prime Minister, Mizengo Pinda, organised a cross-governmental implementation group in 2011 to bring the project to fruition [19] . However, cross government consensus, particularly from the Ministry of Finance, was never reached, meaning that no Power Purchase Agreement or sovereign guarantee between the private developers and government were signed. A change in minister in 2012 cemented the stalling of both dam projects. The MEM Minister William Ngeleja (2007–2012) had appeared supportive of dams and was due to fund more detailed preparatory studies for Stiegler’s Gorge. In contrast, the new minister in 2012 (Sospeter Muhongo) echoed another view held by parts of the ruling CCM that Tanzania should diversify its power generation from climate-vulnerable hydropower and rather invest in the nation’s natural gas [19] . This U-turn also stalled other hydropower projects: As Table 1 shows, the Ruhudji Dam was nearing construction with the support of World Bank guarantees and the Malagarasi and Kakono projects had funding from the US’ ‘Power Africa’ scheme and African Development Bank respectively. The change also stalled the Singida Wind farm which had been under development by private companies with donor support for a near decade by 2012. Thus, these cases demonstrate that presidential approval, external funding and apparent support from MEM did not signal long-term, cross-government commitment. Funding Information: This article was supported by the UK's Economic and Social Science Research Council (ESRC) under a Grant [Grant No. ES/J500112/1].through 3+ Doctoral Scholarship. I thank Isack Asfao for his vital help assisting this research project's fieldwork. I also thank my supervisor Professor Ricardo Soares de Oliveira for his support and guidance. I am indebted to Dr Laura Brinker for her detailed feedback during the article's drafting and to Dr Susann Stritzke for her crucial suggestions which greatly improved the final version. The reviewers were useful and improved the paper's structure and content, including with empirical pointers. Funding Information: This article was supported by the UK’s Economic and Social Science Research Council ( ESRC ) under a Grant [Grant No. ES/J500112/1 ].through 3+ Doctoral Scholarship. I thank Isack Asfao for his vital help assisting this research project’s fieldwork. I also thank my supervisor Professor Ricardo Soares de Oliveira for his support and guidance. I am indebted to Dr Laura Brinker for her detailed feedback during the article’s drafting and to Dr Susann Stritzke for her crucial suggestions which greatly improved the final version. The reviewers were useful and improved the paper’s structure and content, including with empirical pointers. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Elsevier Ltd |
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