Antounian, C, Dah, MA and Harakeh, M (2021) Excessive managerial entrenchment, corporate governance, and firm performance. Research in International Business and Finance, 56. 101392. ISSN 0275-5319
Abstract
This paper investigates the differential impact of positive and negative excessive managerial entrenchment on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, CEO compensation, and firm performance. We measure the degree of managerial entrenchment using the E-index introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Our findings suggest that an increase in excess CEO entrenchment reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor performance. We also show a positive association between excessive entrenchment and CEO compensation as managers gain more power and authority when they are entrenched. On the other hand, excess CEO entrenchment has an inverse correlation with firm performance and firm value. Overall, we propose that excessive managerial entrenchment has a converse impact on board monitoring and shareholders’ welfare.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of an article published in Research in International Business and Finance. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | CEO entrenchment; Corporate governance; Turnover-performance sensitivity; Managerial compensation; Firm performance |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2022 15:49 |
Last Modified: | 25 Jun 2023 23:07 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101392 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:191559 |
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Filename: Antounian, Dah, & Harakeh (2021) - RIBAF - accepted version.pdf
Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0