Trueman, Rob orcid.org/0000-0002-2908-7985 (2022) Truth without Dependence. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. pp. 89-121. ISSN 1467-8349
Abstract
According to the Dependency Theory, truth asymmetrically depends on the world, in the following sense: true propositions are true because the world makes them true. The Dependency Theory strikes many philosophers as incontrovertible, but in this paper I reject it. I begin by presenting a problem for the Dependency Theory. I then develop an alternative to the Dependency Theory which avoids that problem. This alternative is an immodest Identity Theory of Truth, and I end the paper by responding to Dodd’s charge that immodest Identity Theories are incoherent.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2022 The Aristotelian Society. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 04 Jul 2022 13:30 |
Last Modified: | 31 Mar 2025 23:09 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akac012 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | No |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/arisup/akac012 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:188706 |