Del Ponte, A., DeScioli, P., Masiliunas, A. et al. (1 more author) (2021) One-way routes complicate cooperation in migrant crises. Scientific Reports, 11 (1). 13529. ISSN 2045-2322
Abstract
How can countries cooperate to shelter migrants? We use experimental economics to study the distinct challenges of cooperation in migrant crises. We designed an economic game, pass the buck, where participants are leaders of countries who decide whether to shelter migrants or pass them to the next country. We examine the difficulties posed by one-way migration and differences in wealth. We find that leaders sheltered migrants less often when they received them first on a one-way route, compared to when everyone received migrants at the same time. Moreover, the first leader became more likely to shelter migrants when the last country could return them to the first. When one country was wealthier, the wealthy leader sheltered more and the other leaders passed more. We discuss the implications for international cooperation in migrant crises.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2021. Open Access: This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 24 Jun 2022 11:11 |
Last Modified: | 24 Jun 2022 11:11 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Nature Publishing Group |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1038/s41598-021-92861-1 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:188376 |