Chamberlain, J. orcid.org/0000-0001-6727-4127 (2022) Hume on calm passions, moral sentiments, and the "common point of view". Hume Studies, 47 (1). pp. 79-101. ISSN 0319-7336
Abstract
I argue for a thorough reinterpretation of Hume's "common point of view" thesis, at least within his moral Enquiry. Hume is typically understood to argue that we correct for sympathetically produced variations in our moral sentiments, by undertaking an imaginative exercise. I argue that Hume cannot consistently claim this, because he argues that we automatically experience the same degree of the same moral sentiment towards all tokens of any one type of character trait. I then argue that, in his Enquiry at least, Hume only believes that we correct for variations in our non-moral sentiments. When he claims that we sometimes choose a "common point of view," he just means that we sometimes choose to verbally express our calm, moral sentiments, and no other passions, when we publicly evaluate people's characters.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2022 The Hume Society. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Hume Studies. Uploaded here by permission of the publisher. For the version of record please see: https://www.humesociety.org/hs |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2022 08:00 |
Last Modified: | 22 Jun 2022 06:29 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Hume Society |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1353/hms.2022.0005 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:188249 |