Espinola-Arredondo, A., Stathopoulou, E. and Munoz-Garcia, F. (2022) Regulators and environmental groups : better together or apart? Environment and Development Economics, 27 (1). pp. 40-66. ISSN 1355-770X
Abstract
This paper examines green alliances between environmental groups (EGs) and polluting firms, which have become more common in the last decades, and analyzes how they affect policy design. We first show that the activities of regulators and EGs are strategic substitutes, giving rise to free-riding incentives on both agents. Nonetheless, the presence of the EG yields smaller welfare benefits when firms are subject to regulation than when they are not. In addition, the introduction of environmental policy yields large welfare gains when the EG is absent but small benefits when the EG is already present.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 The Author(s). This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Environment and Development Economics. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
Keywords: | Environmental groups; Green alliances; Abatement; Environmental policy; Strategic substitutes; Welfare gains |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 22 Mar 2022 10:57 |
Last Modified: | 23 Mar 2022 09:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press (CUP) |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/s1355770x21000024 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:185021 |