Self-deception about truthfulness

Contemporary political discourse is awash with concerns about truthfulness, understood as the virtue of making sure that our beliefs are true, in political life. The central argument of this paper is that it is not only possible for us to be self-deceived as to our own truthfulness but that there is good reason to suspect certain aspects of the way we understand and value truthfulness make it something which we may be particularly prone to being self-deceived about. If that is correct, then not only do we have further reason for thinking that self-deception in politics may be more common than we might like to think, it also (a) helps us understand why claims about truthfulness seem more likely to perpetuate and intensify conflicts in politics; (b) suggests that the possibility of our being self-deceived about our truthfulness stands sufficiently independent of our first-order beliefs, be they true or false, such that it is likely to appear across the various political divides rather than being exclusive to one group; and (c) requires us to reconsider the problem represented by “post-truth” politics and the responses that might be appropriate to it.