Holroyd, J. and Picinali, F. (2021) Excluding evidence for integrity's sake. In: Dahlman, C., Stein, A. and Tuzet, G., (eds.) Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law. Oxford University Press , Abingdon , 83-C6.N. ISBN 9780198859307
Abstract
In recent years, the concept of “integrity” has been frequently discussed by scholars, and deployed by courts, in the domain of criminal procedure. In this chapter, the authors are concerned with how the concept has been employed in relation to the problem of the admissibility of evidence obtained improperly. In conceptualizing and addressing this problem, the advocates of integrity rely on it as a standard of conduct for the criminal justice authorities and as a necessary condition for the state authority to condemn and punish. The authors raise a series of challenges that need answering before integrity can perform these roles. Their aim is not to show that integrity is useless in normative theorizing about the admissibility of evidence, and about the criminal process in general. Rather, it is to give guidance for the elaboration of a theory of integrity that is cogent, coherent, and has useful implications for the process of proof.
Metadata
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Editors: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 Oxford University Press. This is an author-produced version of a chapter subsequently published in Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | integrity; integrity as balancing; exclusion of evidence; separation thesis; balancing; criminal investigation; problem of scope; improperly obtained evidence; trial fairness |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 09 Aug 2021 13:23 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2023 00:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/oso/9780198859307.003.0007 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:176821 |