Currás-Lorenzo, G, Navarrete, A, Pereira, M et al. (1 more author) (2021) Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant quantum key distribution based on random sampling theory. Physical Review A, 104 (1). 012406. ISSN 2469-9934
Abstract
The core of security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) is the estimation of a parameter that determines the amount of privacy amplification that the users need to apply in order to distill a secret key. To estimate this parameter using the observed data, one needs to apply concentration inequalities such as random sampling theory or Azuma's inequality. The latter can be straightforwardly employed in a wider class of QKD protocols, including those that do not rely on basis-independent sources such as the loss-tolerant (LT) protocol. However, when applied to real-life finite-length QKD experiments, Azuma's inequality typically results in substantially lower secret-key rates. Here we propose an alternative security analysis of the LT protocol against general attacks, for both its prepare-and-measure and measurement-device-independent versions, that is based on random sampling theory. Consequently, our security proof provides considerably higher secret-key rates than the previous finite-key analysis based on Azuma's inequality. This work opens up the possibility of using random sampling theory to provide alternative security proofs for other QKD protocols.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | ©2021 American Physical Society. This is an author produced version of an article published in Physical Review A. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Engineering & Physical Sciences (Leeds) > School of Electronic & Electrical Engineering (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 26 Aug 2021 09:23 |
Last Modified: | 26 Aug 2021 19:43 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | American Physical Society |
Identification Number: | 10.1103/PhysRevA.104.012406 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:176101 |