Yang, Zaifu orcid.org/0000-0002-3265-7109 and Sun, Ning (2021) Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets. Journal of Economic Theory. 105259. ISSN 0022-0531
Abstract
We propose a senior level job matching model with multiple heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. An agent (firm or worker) can be committed or uncommitted (i.e., free). A committed agent is bound by her commitment and cannot unilaterally dissolve her partnership unless her partner agrees to do so. A free agent can make decisions independently. Every agent has preferences over multiple contracts and tries to find her best possible partner with a contract. We examine the problem of how to match workers and firms as well as possible and to set free as many committed agents as possible without violating any commitment. We show the existence of stable and (strict) core matchings through our designed market mechanism and obtain a lattice result for such outcomes and incentive compatibility results for the mechanism.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 29 Jun 2021 14:10 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 17:40 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105259 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105259 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:175719 |
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