Gustafsson, Johan orcid.org/0000-0002-9618-577X (2021) Utilitarianism without Moral Aggregation. Canadian journal of philosophy. pp. 256-269. ISSN 0045-5091
Abstract
Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better because it has a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves a controversial form of moral aggregation, because it is based on a comparison between aggregates of different people’s well-being. Still, an alternative justification-the Argument for Best Outcomes-does not involve moral aggregation. I extend the Argument for Best Outcomes to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 14 Jun 2021 11:40 |
Last Modified: | 07 Feb 2025 00:31 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2021.20 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/can.2021.20 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:175185 |
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