Odolinski, O orcid.org/0000-0001-7852-403X (2019) Contract design and performance of railway maintenance: Effects of incentive intensity and performance incentive schemes. Economics of Transportation, 18. pp. 50-59. ISSN 2212-0122
Abstract
In this paper we study the effect of contract design on the performance of railway maintenance in Sweden, using a panel data set over the period 2003–2013. The effect of incentive intensity is estimated, showing that the power of incentive schemes improve performance as measured by the number of infrastructure failures. In addition, we show that the structure of the performance incentive schemes has resulted in a reallocation of effort from failures not causing train delays to failures causing train delays, with a substantial increase in the former type of failures. This signals a deteriorating asset condition, which highlights the need to consider the long-term effects of this incentive structure. Overall, this work shows that the design of the incentive structures has a large impact on the performance of maintenance, and that the estimated effects are important to consider when assessing contract designs within this field.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of an article, published in Economics of Transportation. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Contract design; Incentive intensity; Maintenance; Rail; Infrastructure |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Environment (Leeds) > Institute for Transport Studies (Leeds) > ITS: Economics and Discrete Choice (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 07 Apr 2021 11:35 |
Last Modified: | 07 Apr 2021 11:35 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.ecotra.2019.05.001 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:172753 |
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