Basu, S, Aulakh, PS and Munjal, S orcid.org/0000-0002-8713-687X (2021) Pluralistic Ignorance, Risk Perception, and the Governance of the Dark Side in Peer-to-Peer Transactions: Evidence from the Indian Banking Industry. Journal of Business Research, 129. pp. 328-340. ISSN 0148-2963
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of pluralistic ignorance as a credible governance mechanism mitigating the emergence of the dark side in peer-to-peer transactions. Using the empirical context of the Indian banking industry, this paper identifies three underlying dimensions of pluralistic ignorance arising from firm, relationship, and institutional factors and links them to peer-to-peer transaction preferences, especially under conditions of uncertainty. By focusing on a particular type of interorganizational relationship that is recurrent but devoid of specific asset investment, this paper provides an alternative governance mechanism that complements the formal and relational contract-based approaches to mitigating the dark side in interorganizational transactions prevalent in the existing literature.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of an article published in Journal of Business Research. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Pluralistic ignorance; Dark-side governance mechanisms; Contagious risk perception; Peer-to-peer transaction; Nonperforming assets; Indian banks |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > International Business Division (LUBS) (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 08 Mar 2021 14:46 |
Last Modified: | 19 Sep 2022 00:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.02.061 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:171832 |