The presumption of assurance

Abstract

According to the Assurance Theory of testimony, in telling an audience something, a speaker offers their assurance that what is told is true, which is something like their guarantee, or promise, of truth. However, speakers also tell lies and say things they do not have the authority to back up. So why does understanding tellings to be a form of assurance explain how tellings can provide a reason for belief? This paper argues that reasons come once it is recognised that tellings are trusted. And the logic by means of which trust gives reason to believe is quite general; it applies equally to belief that is based on evidence rather than assurance. Outlining this logic requires the introduction of the idea of epistemic presumptions, whose truth plays the role of ensuring a connection between believer, justification and truth.

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Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Faulkner, P.
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© The Author(s) 2021. Open Access: This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Keywords:	Knowledge; Testimony;· Assurance; Trust; Justifcation; Induction
Dates:	Accepted: 4 February 2021 Published (online): 17 February 2021 Published: December 2021
Institution:	The University of Sheffield
Academic Units:	The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited:	10 Feb 2021 08:40
Last Modified:	17 Feb 2022 09:39
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Springer Nature
Refereed:	Yes
Identification Number:	10.1007/s11229-021-03074-y
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:170677

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The presumption of assurance

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