Lenman, J (2019) Ethics and perception : two kinds of quasi-realism. In: Cowie, C and Rowland, R, (eds.) Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge (Taylor & Francis) ISBN 9781138318335
Abstract
Michael Huemer think the realist about ethical intuition is no worse off than the realist about sense perception when it comes to addressing the challenge of skepticism and so if we reject scepticism about the external, empirical world we should also reject scepticism about ethics. But we do not face in either domain a stark choice between realism and skepticism. There is a range of intermediate options and these options seem much more credible in the ethical case than the perceptual.
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Item Type: | Book Section |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 The Author. This is an author-produced version of a chapter subsequently published in Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 09 Feb 2021 11:30 |
Last Modified: | 14 Apr 2021 00:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Routledge (Taylor & Francis) |
Identification Number: | 10.4324/9780429454677-11 |
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Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:169887 |