Rablen, M. orcid.org/0000-0002-3521-096X and Samuel, A. (2021) Self-reporting and market structure. Economica, 88 (351). pp. 782-808. ISSN 0013-0427
Abstract
Many regulators utilize self-reporting, that is, wrongdoers reporting their own crimes to the authority, to enforce regulations in a variety of market contexts. This paper studies the effectiveness of self-reporting within the context of an oligopoly. We identify two important consequences of implementing self-reporting (relative to no-reporting) for a welfare-maximizing regulator. First, if the regulator can control only the audit probability and fine, then whether compliance rises or falls upon implementing self-reporting depends on the level of competition. Second, if the regulator can also control the market size, then the welfare-maximizing policy entails self-reporting but with more competition and lower compliance than under no-reporting.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 The Authors. Economica published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and Political Science This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Keywords: | Law enforcement; self-reporting; Cournot oligopoly; market structure |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 19 Jan 2021 11:33 |
Last Modified: | 04 Jun 2021 11:47 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/ecca.12365 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:169810 |