Tallant, Jonathan and Ingram, David orcid.org/0000-0002-0184-9271 (2020) The Rotten Core of Presentism. Synthese. 3969–3991. ISSN: 0039-7857
Abstract
Recently, some have attempted to reformulate debates in first-order metaphysics, particularly in the metaphysics of time and modality, for reasons due to Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013). In this paper, we focus on the ways in which the likes of Cameron, Correia and Rosenkranz, Deasy, Ingram, Tallant, Viebahn, inter alia, have initiated and responded to attempts to capture the core of presentism using a formal, logical machinery. We argue that such attempts are doomed to fail because there is no theoretical core to presentism. There is no single view or family of views that is presentism.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2020. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 27 Nov 2020 15:40 |
Last Modified: | 16 Sep 2025 15:30 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02965-w |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11229-020-02965-w |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:168339 |
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