Lanari Bo, Inacio and Ko, Chiu Yu (2020) Competitive screening and information transmission. Journal of Public Economic Theory. ISSN 1097-3923
Abstract
We consider a model in which schools and colleges compete for high-ability students, which are independently identified through a costly screening procedure. This independence creates a channel through which students' preferences affect the strategic interaction between schools: students with competing offers accept the most preferred one, increasing the screening costs of unpopular schools. When preferences between schools are more heterogeneous, schools screen more, increasing the proportion of students with multiple offers, but paradoxically reducing the extent to which their preferences determine their outcomes. By observing the students' schools of origin, colleges can free-ride of the fierce competition that occurs during screening.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2020 Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 30 Oct 2020 13:40 |
Last Modified: | 26 Feb 2025 00:06 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12489 |
Status: | Published online |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/jpet.12489 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:167446 |
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